Financial Structure and Market Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Industry by Jean LEFOLL & Stylianos PERRAKIS
THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
40, Bd. du Pont dÕArve
PO Box, 1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland 
Tel  (++4122) 312 09 61  
Fax (++4122) 312 10 26
http: //www.fame.ch 
E-mail: admin@fame.ch
FAME - International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering
Research Paper N° 96
December 2002
Jean LEFOLL 
HEC-University of Geneva and FAME
Stylianos PERRAKIS 
John Molson School of Business, Concordia University
Financial Structure and
Market Equilibrium in a





Financial Structure and Market Equilibrium in a Vertically 
Differentiated Industry 
 





  . 







 This paper examines the effects of uncertainty and the choice of financial structure in a 
vertically differentiated duopoly. In the market model consumers are located along a 
continuum of taste parameters and prefer unanimously higher to lower qualities when quality 
prices are set at average variable cost. In such a model only two firms can survive with a 
positive market share. We introduce uncertainty in demand by varying the range of the 
consumer taste parameter and consider a simultaneous game of sequential choices of 
quality, financial structure and product price, with varying order of decision-making and 
revelation of information. We consider both restricted and free entry. It is shown that financial 
structure affects market equilibrium, which is also heavily dependent on the order of choice 
of structure and quality, as well as on whether uncertainty exists in the lower or the upper 
limit of the taste parameter. In all cases leverage increases the lower quality and in most 
cases it also increases the lower quality price. There are also welfare implications, with the 
use of leverage when it is optimal improving both total and consumer surplus. 
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  The fact that financial structure affects investment, pricing and output decisions in 
oligopolistic industries has been known for several years, at least since Brander and 
Lewis' 1986 article. These effects have, however, attracted relatively little attention, as 
noted in the 1991 survey by Harris and Raviv. A few more studies, especially empirical 
ones, have been added in the decade since that survey
1, but overall the topic seems 
to be relatively neglected in both the economics and financial literature. Existing 
studies have mostly dealt with homogenous product oligopolies, and have examined 
the effect of leverage on pricing and output, as well as on barriers to entry and the 
feasibility of entry deterrence
2. A few recent works have also examined leverage 
effects in industries with differentiated products, although the nature of differentiation 
has been left unspecified and the demand functions have been taken as given in 
modeling the firms’ interaction
3    
 
  This paper examines the effect of leverage and financial structure on the investment, 
pricing and output decisions of firms in an imperfectly competitive industry in which 
product is differentiated by quality. We consider vertically differentiated products, in 
which there is consumer unanimity in ranking the various products available in the 
market. In such markets it is well known that firms compete along both price and 
quality dimensions, by segmenting the market along the characteristics that 
differentiate consumers from each other.  
 
  We examine such markets under uncertainty about consumer preferences for quality 
and consider the effect of financial structure on market equilibrium. It turns out that 
financial structure has a major impact on market equilibrium, affecting both product 
price and product quality under both restricted and free entry. We also show that the 
optimal financial structure is dependent on both the nature of uncertainty as well as 
the sequence of decision-making in the choices of structure and product quality. 
Depending on the case, the optimal structures may contain both equity and debt or be 
all-debt or all-equity. Further, we show that the use of debt when it is optimal has 
positive effects on aggregate welfare and on consumer surplus in many important 
cases.      
 
  Markets  with  vertically  differentiated  products were introduced by Gabsewicz and 
Thisse (1980) and extended by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). The dominant 
characteristic of such differentiated products is that their market structure is demand-
driven and depends on the width of the income (or taste) distribution of consumers. 
Markets contain products with a finite set of quality-price combinations and a set of 
consumers with utility functions dependent on both price and quality, with the 
consumers buying only one unit of product each (or none at all). In such markets it can 
be shown that, subject to relatively mild constraints, only a finite number of firms, each 
one producing a single quality, can survive, even in the face of unrestricted entry.  
This property, termed the finiteness property by Shaked and Sutton (1983), 
determines “natural” market structures that can be shown to depend on the 
aforementioned width of the consumer taste or income distribution. 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Phillips (1994), Chevalier (1995), Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and 
Showalter (1995).  
2 See Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988), and Poitevin (1989). 
3 See Maksimovic and Titman (1991), and Dasgupta and Titman (1998).  
  2   Much attention has been devoted in these markets to the topics of firm entry and 
entry deterrence under varying assumptions about the structure of the entry game. 
Thus, while it is not in general possible to deter entry in a market whose natural 
structure is not a monopoly and where firms are restricted to one quality each, it can 
be shown that entry deterrence can be both feasible and profitable if this last 
assumption is relaxed
4. Similarly, the industry equilibrium depends crucially on 
whether entry is simultaneous or sequential, with the lower-quality entrant able to 
observe the incumbent’s decisions, as well as on whether quality can be altered 
costlessly once it has been chosen. 
 
  By contrast, neither uncertainty nor financial structure has been examined so far in 
such vertically-differentiated industries. Yet these characteristics are undoubtedly 
relevant real life features of these industries. For instance, if consumers are 
differentiated by income there may be a priori randomness in consumer income, 
depending on general economic conditions, which makes the width of the income 
distribution also random. Similarly, in cases where consumers are differentiated by 
tastes there may also be randomness on the width of the distribution of the taste (or 
willigness to pay) parameter, which depends on other products available in the 
market, as well as on consumer income.   
 
  In this paper we examine duopoly models of vertically differentiated products under 
various assumptions concerning the entry game and the financial structures of the 
participating firms. It turns out that the effect of financial structure on the duopoly 
market equilibrium is crucially dependent on the type of uncertainty as well as on the 
sequence of information revelation with respect to the sequence of decision-making by 
the firm. In markets where price and output must be chosen under uncertainty 
financial structure affects the product market equilibrium, with the use of debt raising 
both qualities and, in most cases, prices as well. This result is robust with respect to 
various assumptions about the type of uncertainty and the sequence of firm decision-
making, even though the nature of market equilibrium is sensitive to these 
assumptions.  
 
    We also examine the existence of an optimal financial structure. This structure 
depends on the nature of uncertainty, the parameters of the problem and the 
sequence of decision-making. We identify conditions under which an optimal degree 
of leverage exists in equilibrium in several important cases. This optimal leverage is 
independent of taxation or bankruptcy costs, unlike the conventional Modigliani-Miller 
(1958, 1963). This result also has several consequences with respect to the feasibility 
of entry deterrence. 
 
  The use of debt in industries with products differentiated by quality presents interest 
also because such industries have special features that distinguish them sharply from 
conventional homogenous product oligopolies. Firms are, by nature, asymmetric and 
compete in two dimensions of the product, price and quality, with the latter chosen 
upon entry and the former chosen subsequently given the quality choice. Further, the 
limited capacity of the market to accommodate new entry allows incumbent firms to 
relax price competition by occupying opposite ends of the quality spectrum.  
 
                                                 
4 See Constantatos and Perrakis (1997). 
  3   The asymmetric nature of the incumbent firms also has a crucial impact on the way 
uncertainty affects the choice of capital structure. In the duopoly structure that 
emerges uncertainty on the width of the taste parameter distribution, the equivalent of 
demand uncertainty in homogenous products industries, can affect only one of the two 
competing firms if it affects the lower or the higher parameter limit. In the former case 
debt is always profitable for the firm that is affected by uncertainty, while in the latter 
case the optimal structure can be all-equity. This difference stems from the fact that, 
given optimal price choices, competition on quality levels has a differential impact on 
the two firms: ceteris paribus an increase of the higher quality level raises the profit of 
the lower quality firm, while an increase in the lower quality level lowers the profit of 
the higher quality firm.          
 
  In the next section we present the general model and summarize the results under 
certainty. We consider markets in which consumers are differentiated with respect to 
the taste parameter distribution. Uncertainty is introduced in the following section, 
while subsequent sections examine financial structure under various uncertainty 
specifications. To keep the models simple, most of our results are examined in 
structures in which a natural duopoly exists under all uncertainty situations. We also 
abstract from the impact of uncertainty on entry by assuming initially that no entry 




II.  The General Model  
 
  We consider a market with a universe of consumers, each one buying one unit of the 
product, and characterized by the following consumer utility function, which is 
commonly used in vertically differentiated markets: 
 
U = uit – pi , i=1,2,       ( 1 )  
 
where ui is a product quality index, pi its corresponding price, and t is a consumer 
taste parameter that indicates the preference for quality of a particular consumer, the 
marginal utility with respect to quality. The parameter t is drawn from a given set of 
consumers uniformly distributed in t ∈ [a,b]. For simplicity, assume the density of the 
income distribution equals one. Equation (1) implies that at equal prices consumers 
unanimously prefer the product with the higher u.  
 
  Firms in this market produce one quality each. A natural duopoly exists in such a 
market
5 if the average variable cost does not rise “too much” with quality and if the 
width of the income distribution is such that unanimity is preserved when prices are 
set equal to average variable costs. This happens if the width of the interval in which 
consumer tastes are located is within the bounds 2a < b < 4a. In such a case it can be 
shown that the market can support exactly two firms with positive market shares, and 
that the market is fully covered, with each consumer buying one unit of the product. 
For b < 2a the market can support only one firm (a natural monopoly), while for b > 4a 
the market can support a third firm. In our duopoly firm 1 is the high quality and firm 2 
the low quality firm, implying that u1 > u2.  
 
                                                 
5 See Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). 
  4  
  In a natural duopoly any third firm entering the market can gain market share only by 
displacing an existing lower quality firm. Consumers with a high (low) value of the 
taste parameter t buy from firm 1 (firm 2). Let also td indicate the taste parameter of 
the marginal consumer, the one who is indifferent between buying quality 1 or quality 
2. It is easy to see that: 
 
td = (p1 – p2)/(u1 – u2) .     ( 2 )  
 
Hence, the market shares of firms 1 and 2 are b-td and td – a respectively.  
 
  For the production side of our model we assume that the variable cost of production 
is the same for both firms and, without loss of generality, it is taken to be equal to 0, in 
which case the prices are interpreted as the excess over unit cost. Higher qualities, 
however, are allowed to have a higher fixed cost. The cost of quality u will be 
generally assumed to be an increasing and convex function F(u), with F’ ≥ 0,  F” ≥ 0. 
Alternatively, F can be assumed constant, like a patent or a license fee; both 
assumptions are relevant and both will be used in this paper. This cost is assumed 
irrecoverable (sunk) once entry has taken place. Let Fi ≡ F(ui), i=1,2.  
 
  We assume that the entry game is simultaneous, and that firm 1 is predetermined to 
choose the higher quality. It will also be assumed initially that no further entry will be 
allowed into the sector, an assumption that will be relaxed later on. Hence, the game 
sequence is entry and choice of quality, followed by production decisions taken 
simultaneously by choosing prices independently (a Bertrand-type of game). The 
game terminates after one period.  
 
  Under certainty the equilibrium of this game starts with the choice of the two prices 
under the Bertrand assumption given the quality levels. The solution is well-known and 
only the results will be stated below. The game starts by maximizing the net revenues 
Ri, i=1,2, given by: 
 
R1= p1(b-td) – F1= p1(b-(p1 – p2)/(u1 – u2)) – F1, R2 = p2((p1 – p2)/(u1 – u2) – a) – F2.   (3) 
 
Maximizing in p1 and p2, we find that the optimal prices pi*, i=1,2 are given by
6: 
 
p1* = (2b-a)(u1 – u2)/3, p2* = (b-2a)(u1 – u2)/3.        (4) 
 
Substituting (2) and (4) into (3) we get the optimal revenues Ri*, i=1,2: 
 
R1* = [(2b-a)/3]
2(u1 – u2) – F1, R2* =  [(b-2a)/3]
2(u1 – u2) – F2.    (5) 
 
  The optimal qualities are chosen simultaneously and independently (a Cournot-type 
assumption), implying that the optimal u1* is given from the equation dR1*/du1=F’ if 
F’>0; otherwise, if F is independent of quality, u1* is equal to the maximum 
technologically feasible quality level u. As for u2*, it is chosen by decreasing u2 to the 
                                                 
6 This maximization assumes that at the existing quality levels we have u2a≥(b-2a)(u1 – u2)/3. This 
technical assumption effectively insures that there is full market coverage at the existing market 
equilibrium. See Tirole (1988), p. 296. Such an assumption will also be adopted when uncertainty 
is introduced further on in this section.  
  5 minimum level consistent with the full market coverage (see note 6). This is the level 
at which the consumer with taste parameter a is indifferent between purchasing or not, 




2), u2* = [u1*(b-2a)/3]/[a + (b-2a)/3].      (6) 
 
  Before closing this section on the firm under certainty, we note that the two choice 
variables, prices and qualities, have different strategic effects in interfirm rivalry. 
Indeed, it can be easily seen from (3) that the marginal revenues ∂Ri/∂pi are increasing 
functions of the other firm’s strategic variable pj, for both i,j= 1, 2, i≠j; prices are, 
therefore,  strategic complements in the terminology of Bulow et al (1985). For 
qualities, on the other hand, the marginal revenues  ∂Ri/∂ui are decreasing functions 
(hence, strategic substitutes) of the opponent’s quality uj in (3), while the strategic 
effects of quality disappear if the sequential nature of quality choice are taken into 
account in (5); in the latter case the marginal revenues are independent of the 
opponent’s quality. This fact plays a role in the optimal financial structure when 
uncertainty and debt are introduced in subsequent sections
7.       
 
  In the following sections we introduce uncertainty in the width [a, b] of the buyers’ 
taste parameter distribution, which corresponds in our formulation to uncertainty over 
the size of product demand facing the two firms. 
 
 
III.  Uncertainty in the All-Equity Firm 
 
  We introduce uncertainty by assuming that the width of the set within which the taste 
parameter lies varies randomly at the time the entry decisions are taken. There are 
many ways of representing such randomness. In what follows we shall initially assume 
that the upper limit parameter b remains unchanged, while the lower limit a varies 
continuously within a given interval [a , a], and let a denote the expectation of a, 
whose distribution function is G(.). Alternatively, we could have chosen a fixed a and a 
randomly varying b. This model, which is discussed as an extension in subsequent 
sections, does not yield the same results concerning financial structure as when a is 
taken as random. In real life both a and b may vary randomly, but when it is a that 
varies the entire impact of uncertainty falls on the lower quality firm 2. In all cases it is 
assumed that firms are risk-neutral, maximizing expected profits. 
 
  Of particular interest is the revelation of uncertainty with respect to the sequence of 
decision-making. If uncertainty is revealed before prices are chosen then (2), (4) and 
(5) still hold, and uncertainty affects only the optimal choice of qualities, chosen by 
maximizing the expectations of the expressions in (5). The optimal qualities are then 
given by (6), with the expectation of the expression in the argument for u1*, and with 
the replacement of a by the lower limit a for u2*. 
 
  The only interesting element that the introduction of uncertainty brings to the analysis 
is the fact that both firms’ profits are increasing functions of the variance of the random 
parameter a, as it can be easily seen by taking the expectations in (5). Otherwise, 
uncertainty will have no effect on market equilibrium. When there is debt in the firm’s 
                                                 
7 The differential impact on the optimal capital structure of strategic substitutes and complements 
in homogenous firms appears very clearly in Showalter (1995). 
  6 capital structure the revelation of the value of a will also reveal whether default will 
occur before prices are chosen, implying that the debt holders will write into the debt 
contract provisions for taking control of the firm in such cases. Hence, financial 
structure will have no effect on market equilibrium.  
 
  We assume, therefore, that the true value of a is revealed after prices have been 
chosen. Since consumer tastes are unobservable ex ante, such an assumption has 
also the advantage of being closer to reality. We also assume that the variations in a 
are such that the market remains always a natural duopoly, with 2a < b < 4a for all a. 
This limits the allowable width [a , a], since we must have 2a < b and 4a > b, 
implying that we must have a < 2a. This assumption is innocuous with respect to the 
interesting results, but it does simplify the analysis by avoiding the changes in 
functional forms which would be necessary if the market were to become a monopoly 
or remain uncovered for some values of a. 
 
  For all-equity firms the choices of the optimal prices pi, i=1,2, is the same as if we 
were to replace a by a in (3), implying that (4) also holds with a instead of a. Now, 
however, while the profit R1* is still given by (5) with the substitution of a for a, the 
profit R2* is ex ante random and given by:   
 
R2* =  [(b-2a)/3](u1 – u2)[(b+a)/3 – a] – F2.     (7) 
 
Taking the expectation in (7) it can be easily seen that for an all-equity firm uncertainty 
still yields the same result as certainty, with (5) holding for both firms with a replacing 
a. The optimal quality u1* is chosen by the same expression (6) as in the certainty 
case, while u2* is also chosen by (6), by setting it so that full market coverage will exist 
for all values of a, with a replacing a in (6) and with u2* equal to p2*/a.  
 
  The situation changes, however, when we examine the introduction of debt in the 
financial structure of firm 2. A key element in this case is the time point at which 
financial structure is chosen, relative to the choices of price and quality. We 
distinguish the following cases: 
 
i)  The financial structure is chosen after the choice of prices and qualities. 
ii)  The financial structure is chosen before prices but after quality choices. 
iii)  The financial structure is chosen before both qualities and prices. 
 
  Case (i) is equivalent to the conventional Modigliani-Miller (MM) solution, according 
to which financial structure is irrelevant in the absence of corporate income taxes. 
Indeed, we can easily see that the relevant objective functions to maximize in order to 
find the optimal prices and qualities are the values of the two firms, which are found by 
taking the expectations in (3) for given prices and qualities whether there is debt or 
not. Hence, the product market equilibrium is identical to that of the all-equity case and 
is, therefore, independent of financial structure. This case is also not very realistic on 
economic grounds, since the choice of product prices normally takes place after the 
firm has been established and financial structure has been chosen. 
 
  The decision-making sequences in cases (ii) and (iii) are shown in Figure 1. In these 
cases the MM result definitely does not hold, as it will be seen when we examine them 
in detail in the next section. 
 
  7  
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Case (ii): quality before structure 
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IV.  The Effect of Leverage on Product Market Equilibrium 
 
    We assume that firm 2 is partially financed by debt, whose promised repayment 
amount is equal to D. For a sufficiently large D the firm will go into default at the end of 
the production period, with the bondholders acquiring control. In both cases shown in 
Figure 1 it is initially assumed that D is exogenously fixed when prices are chosen. As 
for firm 1, its financial structure is not relevant since it is not affected directly by 
uncertainty, even though its choices of price and quality are clearly dependent on 
those of firm 2. We also assume that D is common knowledge at the times the 
qualities and prices are chosen. 
 
    From (3) it is clear that the firm 2 revenue R2 is a decreasing function of the 
parameter a. Let a1 denote the value of a at which the firm is just able to repay its debt 
obligation. The firm is solvent for a∈[a, a1], and in default for higher values of a. The 
value a1 is given by: 
 
p2(td – a1)– F2 = p2[(p1 – p2)/(u1 – u2) – a1] = D,                 (8) 
 
where td is given by (2). 
 
  To find the optimal prices we now maximize the firm 2 equity value E2 with respect to 
p2 for a given p1. Since E2 is equal to the expected profit under solvency minus the 
promised payment, we find by subtracting (8) from the value of R2 given by (3) that, 
 





− = ∫ ,        ( 9 )  
whose maximization with respect to p2 taking into account (2) and (7) yields: 
  8 ∫ = − − −
1 a
a
2 1 2 1 0 a]dG(a) ) u )/(u 2p [(p .       ( 1 0 )  
 
  This can be rewritten under the following form: 
 
[(p1-2p2)/(u1-u2)] = E[aa ≤ a1] ≡ a1,  p2 = p1/2 - a1(u1 –u2)/2,     (11) 
 
where a1 denotes the truncated expectation of a given that it is less than a. On the 
other hand, the maximization of R1 with respect to p1 yields: 
 
        p1 = b(u1 – u2)/2 + p2/2 .       (12) 
 
Solving now (11) and (12), we find that the optimal prices p1D* and p2D* under 
leverage are given with the same expressions as (4), with a1 replacing a.  
 
  Consider now the unlevered solution for firm 2, which is similar to the certainty case 
with a replacing a in (4). In the presence of debt this solution is infeasible if at the 
lowest level of random firm 2 profit, which occurs when a = a, we have: 
 
p2*[(p1* - p2*)/(u1* - u2*) – a] – F(u2*) < D.        
 
Assuming that in such a case a feasible choice of price and quality for firm 2 exists 
given the firm 1 choices (p1, u1), there is a value a1∈(a, a) of a such that relation (8) 
holds at the optimal choices (p2, u2) of firm 2. Since, as argued above, the optimal 
prices p1D* and p2D* are given by the same expressions as (4), with a1 replacing a, the 
optimal revenue R1D* of firm 1 is now given by : 
 
    R1D* = [(2b-a1)/3]
2(u1 – u2) – F1.      ( 1 3 )  
 
Similarly, replacing p2 by p2D* into (9) we get the firm 2 equity: 
 
 E2 = G(a1) (b-2a1)(u1 – u2)(a1 – a1)/3.       ( 1 4 )  
 
  The value of firm 1 is also given by (13), while the value of firm 2 is equal to the 
equity plus the debt. The latter is equal to D for a∈[a, a1] and to the entire revenue 
p2D*(td – a) – F2 for a∈(a1, a]. Replacing E2 from (14), D from (8), and taking the 
expectation, we get: 
 
V2D = (b-2a1)(u1 – u2)[(b + a1)/3 – a]/3 – F2.     ( 1 5 )  
 
  A key issue at this point is whether quality choice comes before or after the choice of 
capital structure, cases (ii) and (iii) in Figure 1 of the previous section. In case (ii) one 
should choose first the level of D by maximizing V2D given u1 and u2. We may then 
prove the following result. 
 
 
Proposition 1: If there is uncertainty in the lower limit of the consumer taste 
parameter and if the lower quality firm 2 chooses its financial structure after the 
  9 choices of the quality levels u1 and u2 then there exists a unique leveraged optimal 
capital structure for the firm. This optimal capital structure is defined by the debt level 
that sets,  
 
  6a –b – 4a1 = 0,          ( 1 6 )  
 
provided this relation yields a value a1∈[a, a]; at that structure the firm will have 
positive debt and equity levels. If, on the other hand, there is no value of a1∈[a, a] 
satisfying (16) the optimal capital structure is 100% debt financing
8. 
 
Proof: Differentiating (15) with respect to D for given u1 and u2,, we note that ∂V2D/∂D 
is proportional to the quantity (∂a1/∂D)(6a –b – 4a1). Since 2a < b < 4a by the natural 
duopoly assumption, the sign of the factor 6a –b – 4a1 is ambiguous. Rewriting (8): 
 
(b-2a1)(u1 – u2)[(b + a1)/3 – a1] /3 – F2 = D,        ( 1 7 )  
 
we can easily see that for given u1 and u2 the left-hand-side expression decreases in 
a1, implying that sign(∂a1 / ∂D) < 0. Hence,  
                sign (∂V2D / ∂D) = (- ) sign(∂a1 / ∂D) = (-) sign(∂a1 / ∂D) < (>) 0, 
if 6a –b – 4a1 is greater than (less than) zero. For the all-equity firm D = 0 and a1 = a, 
implying that 6a –b – 4a1 = 2a - b < 0 and sign (∂V2D / ∂D) > 0. On the other hand, for 
the all-debt firm we have a1 = a and 6a –b – 4a1 can be > 0 or <0, since the sign of   
6a - b – 4a is ambiguous. If 6a - b – 4a >0 then sign (∂V2D / ∂D) < 0 and there exists 
an optimal structure with positive amounts of debt and equity, given by                    
6a –b – 4a1 = 0. If 6a –b – 4a ≤0 then the optimal structure is all-debt, QED. 
 
  Given Proposition 1, we can now describe completely the effects of leverage in this 
case (ii), where structure is chosen after the quality levels have been set. This is done 
in the next result.  
 
 
Proposition 2: Under the conditions of Proposition 1 and at the optimal capital 
structure defined in Proposition 1 the following industry equilibrium exists: 
 
a) The optimal quality levels u1D* and u2D* are higher
9 under leverage than the all-
equity levels u1* and u2*; 
b) The corresponding optimal price level p2D* is similarly higher than the all-equity 
level p2*; while the relation between p1D* and p1* is ambiguous; 
c) The  relative quality level u1D*/ u2D* of the optimal quality choices of firms 1 and 2 
under  
      leverage is less than that same ratio u1*/ u2* in the absence of leverage.  
 
Proof: Define X ≡ (b-2a)/3, X1 ≡ [(b-2a1)/3], Y ≡ (2b-a)/3, Y1 ≡ (2b-a1)/3, where a1 = a 
whenever the optimal structure is 100% debt. It is clear that X1 > X and  Y1 > Y. 
Maximizing (5) and (13) with respect to u1 for a given u2 yields Y
2 = ∂F/∂u1  and        
Y1
2 = ∂F/∂u1 respectively, from which u1D* > u1* by the convexity of F. For the choice 
                                                 
8 The notion of an all-debt capital structure is to be considered an abstraction, since it is not 
compatible with the subsequent price-setting decision-making for firm 2, which was assumed to 
maximize the value of the equity. 
9 If the cost of quality is independent of the quality level we obviously have u1D* = u1*. 
  10 of u2 we maximize (5) and (15), in both of which the optimal u2 turns out to be the 
lowest possible consistent with full market coverage, namely u2* = p2*/a  and            
u2D* = p2D*/a. Hence, we have, from (4):  
 
u2* = X(u1* - u2*)/a, u2D* = X1(u1D* - u2D*)/a.        ( 1 8 )  
 
From (18) it is clear that (u1* - u2*)/ u2* > (u1D* - u2D*)/ u2D*, which corresponds to   
(u1*/ u2*) > (u1D*/ u2D*), thus proving part (c). This last relation, together with the 
already proven u1D* > u1* , shows that u2D* > u2* as well, thus completing part (a). Part 
(b) follows immediately from u2* = p2*/a and u2D* = p2D*/a, QED.  
 
  Next we examine case (iii), where qualities are chosen given the capital structure. In 
such a case u1 and u2 in (15) are functions of the debt level D and must be chosen by 
maximizing R1D* from (13) and the equity E2 from (14), taking also (16) into account 
with a given D
10. The solution is, in general, parameter-dependent. We can, however, 
obtain results in an important special case. This is when the cost of quality F is fixed 
and independent of the quality level, like a patent or a license. This case is particularly 
important in the entry-deterrence literature
11, since a fixed cost of quality implies 




Proposition 3: If there is uncertainty in the lower limit of the consumer taste 
parameter and if firm 2 chooses its capital structure before it chooses its quality the 
optimal quality u2D* will be equal to p2D*/a, equal to the minimum level consistent with 
full market coverage for all a if the fixed cost F is independent of quality level. 
 
Proof: Differentiating (14) with respect to u2, we find that the derivative is proportional 
to the quantity,                                                                                                                              
G(a1) (b-2a1)(u1 – u2) (∂a1/∂u2) - (b-2a1)(a1 – a1)  - 2(∂a1/∂u2)(u1 – u2)(a1 – a1), whose 
sign is negative if (∂a1/∂u2) <0 and the sign of the quantity -(b-2a1) - 2(∂a1/∂u2)(u1 – u2) 
is similarly negative. To find the sign of this latter quantity we differentiate (16) with 
respect to u2. The differentiation yields, 
[(b + a1)/3 – a][ - (b-2a1) - 2(∂a1/∂u2)(u1 – u2)] + 
+(b-2a1)(u1 – u2)(∂[(b + a1)/3 – a1]/∂a1)(∂a1/∂u2) = 0,  
from which it follows immediately that ∂a1/∂u2 < 0. Further, the last term of the above 
equation is positive, implying that the other terms must be negative, which in turn 
implies that - (b-2a1) - 2(∂a1/∂u2)(u1 – u2) < 0. Hence, u2 must be reduced as much as 
feasible, implying that u2D* = p2D*/a, QED. 
 
  From Proposition 3 we can then derive the following.  
 
 
Proposition 4: Under the conditions of Proposition 3 assume the debt level D is given 
and corresponds to a positive default probability for firm 2 for at least some of the 
values of the random parameter a. Then leverage has the following effects: 
 
                                                 
10 We assume that D is common knowledge, observable by firm 1 at the time u1 is chosen. 
11 See, for instance, Hung and Schmidt (1988), and Constantatos and Perrakis (1997, 1999). 
  11 a)  The quality level of firm 1 becomes equal to the maximum technologically feasible 
levelu for both levered and unlevered firm 2 cases; 
b) Leverage decreases relative  product differentiation, in the sense that the ratio     
u1D*/ u2D* of the optimal quality choices of firms 1 and 2 under leverage is less than 
that same ratio u1*/ u2* in the absence of leverage, implying in turn that the quality 
level of firm 2 increases under leverage, with u2D* > u2*; 
c)  Leverage increases the price level of firm 2, while its effect on the firm 1 price is 
ambiguous.  
 
Proof: To prove part (b) first, since D is given and F is independent of quality the 
optimal choice of u2 is given by u2D* = p2D*/a, where p2D* = (b-2a1)(u1 – u2)/3 as given 
by (4). Similarly, u2* = p2*/a = (b-2a)(u1 – u2)/3. Hence, (18) holds here as well, and 
(u1* - u2*)/ u2* > (u1D* - u2D*)/ u2D*, which corresponds to u1*/ u2* > u1D*/ u2D*. For part 
(a), we note first from (5) that R1* increases linearly with u1, implying that u1* = u. 
Maximizing now (13) with respect to u1,  we  note  that                    
∂R1D*/∂u1 = Y1
2 – 2Y1(∂a1/∂u1)(u1 – u2)/3. To show that this quantity is positive it 
suffices to show that Y1> 2(∂a1/∂u1)(u1 – u2)/3. From (16), by differentiating with 
respect to u1, it can easily be seen that this last relation holds, implying that 
∂R1D*/∂u1>0 always and that u1D* = u = u1*, thus proving part (a). From parts (a) and 
(b) it also follows that u2D*> u2* and, hence, p2D*> p2*, thus proving part (c), QED. 
 
  The last step is now to determine whether there is an optimal level of debt D, for 
which we maximize (15) taking also into account (16) and the optimally determined 
values u1D* and u2D*. This allows us to derive the market equilibrium for this case. 
 
 
Proposition 5: Under the conditions of Propositions 3 and 4 and if the cost of quality 
is independent of the quality level then the optimal capital structure of firm 2 contains a 
positive amount of debt. It may contain positive amounts of both debt and equity or it 
may consist of 100% debt depending on parameter values. 
 
Proof: From (18) and Propositions 3 and 4 we have the following relation: 
 
u1D* - u2D* = uX1 / (a + X1) .        (19) 
 
Replacing (19) into (15), differentiating with respect to a1 and taking into account from 
(16) that ∂a1/∂D < 0, we get:  
 
 sign(∂V2D/∂D) = [sign(∂a1/∂D)][sign[[(b + a1)/3 – a](-4(a + X1) + 2X1) + X1(a + X1)]] =  
 
= - sign[[(b + a1)/3 – a](-4(a + X1) + 2X1) + X1(a + X1)].    (20) 
 
For D = 0 we have a1 = a and (b + a1)/3 – a = X1 = X, and the expression in (20) 
becomes clearly positive, implying that the optimal amount of debt is positive. For an 
all-debt structure, we have a1 = a, and the sign of the last expression in (20) can be >0 
or < 0, corresponding respectively to a structure with both debt and equity and to an 
all-debt structure, QED.  
 
  Although the optimal capital structure in Proposition 5 is also parameter-dependent 
as in Proposition 1, the two cases yield a different optimal structure, implying that the 
order of decision-making in choosing structure or quality first is an important 
  12 determinant of market equilibrium. This appears clearly in the following numerical 
example: the parameter a is distributed uniformly in the interval [a, a], a = 1.8a,       
b = 3.8a, implying that a = 1.4a. Then under the conditions of Proposition 1 the optimal 
structure is at the value at which a1 = (6a – b)/4 = 1.15a, implying that the structure is 
part equity and part debt. On the other hand, the condition (19) for a1 = a  has            
X1 = 0.6a and (b+a)/3 = 1.6a, which yield: 
[(b + a1)/3 – a](-4(a + X1) + 2X1) + X1(a + X1)] = -.08a
2.  
This means that under the conditions of Proposition 5 ∂V2D/∂D > 0 at a1 = a, and the 
optimal structure is 100% debt in this case.  
 
    Nonetheless, both these cases of uncertainty in the taste parameter's lower limit 
yield qualitatively similar results. In both cases the use of debt has definite advantages 
for the lower quality firm. Although debt reduces the range of values over which equity 
holders realize positive returns, it also increases the size of the equity returns 
whenever the latter occur. The positive effect is sufficiently strong to favor the use of 
debt under all circumstances, even though the strategic advantages conferred by debt 
are clearly dependent on the order of decision-making.  
 
  An  important  consideration in examining the effects of leverage is the impact of 
leverage on the total value of the two firms. The following result will also be used in 
assessing the impact of leverage under free entry conditions. 
 
 
Proposition 6: If the cost of quality is independent of quality level then under the 
conditions of both Propositions 1 and 5 leverage increases the value of the lower 
quality firm and decreases the value of the higher quality firm.   
 
Proof: If the cost of quality F is independent of quality level then we have                   
u1* = u1D* = u and u2D* = X1(u1D* - u2D*)/a = X1(u  - u2D*)/a from (18). Solving for u2D* 
and for u – u2D*, we get u2D* = uX1/(a + X1), u – u2D* = ua/(a + X1). Replacing this 
last expression into (13) we find that the two firm values R1D* and V2D* are 
respectively proportional to Y1
2/(a + X1) and X1[(b+a1)/3 – a]/(a + X1). Differentiating 
the first one with respect to a1 we find a positive sign for the derivative, implying that 
R1D* is larger when a1 = a (no debt for firm 2). Differentiating similarly V2D* we find that 
the sign of the derivative is equal to, 
sign{(X1 + a)[-2[(b+a1)/3 – a]/3 + X1/3] + 2[(b+a1)/3 – a]X1/3} = 
=sign{-2[(b+a1)/3 – a]a + X1
2 + X1a}.  
At a1 = a this sign is negative, implying that taking on debt increases the firm 2 value, 
QED.  
 
  When the cost of quality depends on the quality level one or both statements of 
Proposition 6 may still hold depending on the slope of the function F(u). For instance, 
if the slope F’ increases sharply around u1* then u1D* is “close” to u1* and the value of 
firm 1 still decreases with leverage; the firm 2 value may, however, decline with 
leverage since the higher quality u2D* increases the cost of quality. The leverage 
effects are reversed when F’ increases slowly around u1*.     
 
  We close this section by examining the welfare consequences of the use of debt in 
the firms’ capital structure. Propositions 1 to 5 have some important implications for 
the welfare analysis of the duopoly, expressed by the combined consumer and 
producer surplus. In the vertically differentiated market modeled in this paper 
  13 aggregate welfare given the qualities produced remains more or less constant 
whenever prices change
12, with such changes representing transfers from producers 




Proposition 7: In the presence of uncertainty in the lower limit of the consumer taste 
parameter range and under the conditions of Propositions 1 and 5 aggregate welfare 
gross of quality costs
13 increases for all realizations of the random lower limit if the 
lower quality firm 2 is allowed to use debt in its capital structure. Consumer surplus, on 
the other hand, increases unequivocally for all those purchasing the lower quality but 
the effect of firm 2 debt on consumer surplus for the customers of the higher quality 
firm is ambiguous. 
 
Proof: Aggregate welfare or total surplus in this model for a consumer with taste 
parameter equal to t is equal to uit, while consumer surplus is equal to uit – pi, i = 1,2. 
Hence, aggregate welfare W when the lower limit on the taste parameter is equal to a 
is given by: 
 
W =  .       ( 2 1 )  
1
1
(b a )/3 b
*
1
(b a )/3 a







From Propositions 2 and 4 we know that both quality levels (u1
*, u2
*) increase under 
leverage, while the integration limit is (b+a)/3 and (b+a1)/3 respectively without and 
with leverage, with the former exceeding the latter. Hence, W increases under 
leverage for all values of the lower limit a of the consumer taste parameter. On the 
other hand, aggregate consumer surplus is found by replacing the integrands in (21) 
by (ui
*t – pi
*) for i = 1 and 2 in the first and second integrand respectively. From 
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 we know that in all cases u2D
* = p2D
*/a, and similarly that      
p2D
* > p2
*. Hence, consumer welfare is p2D
*(t/a – 1) under leverage and p2
*(t/a -1) 
without leverage for every consumer who purchases low quality with and without 
leverage, while for those consumers in the interval [(b+a1)/3, (b+a)/3] who switch to 
the high quality firm under leverage consumer surplus similarly increases, since 
otherwise they would have stayed with the lower quality. On the other hand, there are 
cases in which the customers of the high quality firm see their consumer surplus 
reduced as a result of the adoption of leverage by the lower quality firm. Indeed, 
assume that leverage increases p1D
* above p1
* under the conditions of Proposition 3, 
in which the optimal quality level u1
* remains equal to the highest technologically 
feasible levelu for both levered and unlevered firm 2 cases. In such a case every  
firm 1 customer will have lower consumer surplus under firm 2 leverage than under its 




                                                 
12 The only change may come from the migration of consumers from one to the other quality 
because the marginal consumer td changes when prices change. 
13 The statement in the proposition also holds net of quality costs if the cost of quality is 
independent of quality level. 
  14 V.  The Effect of Uncertainty in the Upper Limit of the Taste Parameter 
 
    Consider now uncertainty in the upper limit b of the taste parameter, which is 
assumed to vary in an interval [b,b], with mean b. The assumption of a natural 
duopoly for all b implies that b > 2a and b < 4a, implying b < 2b. As with the case of 
the previous section, relations (3)-(6) hold true for the all-equity firm, with the mean 
value b replacing b everywhere. 
 
  Although the analysis of the optimal financial structure in this case is very similar to 
that of the previous section, the results are qualitatively different insofar as the all-
equity case appears as an optimal choice of capital structure whenever structure is 
chosen before qualities, while a positive amount of debt is optimal when qualities are 
chosen before structure. In other words, a change in the sequence of decision-making 
is sufficient to nullify the strategic advantages of debt, even though prices are strategic 
complements and qualities have similar strategic properties as when there is 
uncertainty in the lower limit of consumer tastes.  
 
  Let b1∈ (b, b ] denote the value of the consumer taste parameter for which the    
firm 1 revenue is just enough to cover the debt payments D, with default (solvency) 
taking place for b < (>) b1. The following relation is the counterpart of (8) in defining b1: 
 
p1(b1 – td) – F1 = p1[b1 – (p1 –p2)/(u1 – u2)] – F1 = D.     (22) 
 
  Here the firm 2 revenue R2 is given by (3) and is non-random given prices and 
qualities. The value of the equity E1 is 0 for b ≤ b 1, while for b > b1 it is found by 
subtracting (22) from (3). Taking expectations and maximizing with respect to p1 and 
p2 we get the following expressions, which form counterparts of (13)-(15) and (17): 
 
R2D* = [(b1-2a)/3]
2(u1 – u2) – F2,       (23) 
 
E1 = (2b1-a)(u1 – u2)[1 - G(b1)](b1 – b1)/3,      ( 2 4 )  
 
V1D = (2b1-a)(u1 – u2)[b – (b1 + a)/3]/3 – F1,      ( 2 5 )  
 
(2b1-a)(u1 – u2)[b1 – (b1 + a)/3]/3 – F1 = D,       ( 2 6 )  
 
where the quantity b1 is the conditional expectation of b given that it is greater than b1, 
or b1 ≡ E[b b ≥ b1]. We shall adopt the assumption that the distribution of b is such 
that this conditional expectation increases more slowly than b1 when b1 increases, or 
that ∂b1/∂b1 ≤ 1. This technical assumption is innocuous in most cases, but it does 
simplify the proofs of some of the results. In the benchmark uniform distribution case 
this derivative is equal to ½.   
 
  Relation (4) now holds for the optimal prices p1D* and p2D*, with b1 replacing b; a 
similar replacement in (5) yields the optimal firm 2 revenue R2*. We distinguish two 
cases, depending on whether qualities or financial structure is chosen first. If qualities 
are chosen first (case (ii) of Figure 1) we maximize (25) with respect to D for given u1 
and u2, taking into account (26). We then have the following result. 
 
  15 Proposition 8: If there is uncertainty in the upper limit of the consumer taste 
parameter and if the higher quality firm chooses its qualities before it chooses its 
financial structure then the optimal financial structure would always contain a positive 
amount of debt. The optimal financial structure is part equity and part debt if a 
b1∈[b,b] exists satisfying the relation 2[b – 2b1/3] – a/3 = 0; otherwise the optimal 
structure is 100% debt. 
 
Proof: From (26) it is easy to see that the assumption that ∂b1/∂b1 ≤ 1 guarantees that 
∂b1/∂D > 0. Hence, sign(∂V1D/∂D) = sign(∂V1D/∂b1) = sign(∂V1D/∂b1), and differentiating 
(25) we note that this latter sign is also that of the expression,  
2[b – (b1 ∂F/∂u1+ a)/3] - (2b1-a)/3 = 2[b – 2b1/3] – a/3.  
For the all-equity firm b1 = b  and the sign of the expression is positive, while the 
expression decreases as b1 increases, implying that an optimal structure exists if         
2[b – 2b1/3] – a/3 = 0 at some b1 < b, QED.  
 
  For the benchmark case of a uniformly distributed b we have b = (b + b)/2 and       
b1 = (b1 + b)/2. For the all-debt firm we have b1 = b = b1, and the restriction b < 2b 
implies that the expression 2[b – 2b/3] – a/3 is positive and an all-debt structure is 
optimal.  
 
  The next result is similar to Proposition 2 of the previous section. 
 
 
Proposition 9: Under the conditions and at the optimal capital structure of Proposition 
8 the following industry equilibrium exists: 
 
a)  The optimal quality levels u1D* and u2D* are higher
14 under leverage than the 
all-equity levels u1* and u2*; 
b)  The corresponding optimal price levels p1D* and p2D* are similarly higher than 
the all-equity levels p2* and p1*; 
c) The  relative quality level u1D*/ u2D* of the optimal quality choices of firms 1 and 
2 under leverage is lower than that same ratio u1*/ u2* in the absence of 
leverage.  
 
Proof: The proof will only be sketched since it follows along similar lines to that of 
Proposition 2. u1* is found from the solution of the equation [(2b – a)/3]
2 = ∂F/∂u1, 
while from (25) u1D* solves the equation  (2b1-a)[b – (b1 + a)/3]/3 = ∂F/∂u1. From 
Proposition 7 the left-hand-side of the second equation can be shown to exceed that 
of the first one thus proving that u1D*> u1*. Since u2D*= p2D*/a and u2* = p2*/a, 
replacing the optimal prices in (4) with b1  and  b  instead of b and solving for the 
optimal firm 2 quality in the levered and all-equity cases, we can show that u2D*> u2*, 
thus proving part (a) of the Proposition. Parts (b) and (c) also follow immediately from 
part (a) after substitution of the optimal qualities in (4). 
 
  Although the result in Proposition 9 appears broadly similar to that of Proposition 2, 
there are some important differences in the structure of the solution that have welfare 
consequences. Under uncertainty in the lower limit a as in Proposition 2 leverage 
reduces quality differentiation and expands the range of consumers buying the higher 
quality for all values of a, thus improving aggregate welfare gross of quality costs as 
                                                 
14 When the cost of quality is independent of the quality level we have u1* = u1D*. 
  16 shown in Proposition 7. When there is uncertainty in the upper limit b, on the other 
hand, the limits of integration in the aggregate welfare expression  (21)  become          
(b + a)/3 and (b1 + a)/3 for the all-equity and the levered firms respectively, implying 
that the range of consumers buying the lower quality expands under leverage. 
Proposition 7 may not, therefore, necessarily hold for this case, since some 
consumers switch to the lower quality under leverage; this effect will be demonstrated 
further on in this section. As for the consumer surplus, it increases for all those who 
used to purchase the lower quality when the firm was unlevered, but not necessarily 
for those who purchased the upper quality. 
 
  Next we consider the case in which financial structure is chosen before qualities. As 
in the previous section, we obtain unequivocal results by assuming that F’ = 0, or that 
the cost of quality is independent of the quality level. We can then prove the following. 
 
 
Proposition10: If there is uncertainty in the upper limit of the consumer taste 
parameter, if the higher quality firm chooses its financial structure before it chooses its 
quality level, and if the cost of quality is independent of quality level then the optimal 
financial structure for firm 1 is all-equity. 
 
Proof: We maximize (24) with respect to u1, with b1 given by (26) for a fixed D. First 
we differentiate (26) with respect to u1 and we observe that for a given D and a fixed F 
and for ∂b1/∂b1 ≤ 1 we must have ∂b1/∂u1 < 0. Next we differentiate (24) with respect to 
u1 and we find: 
 
sign(∂E1/∂u1) = sign{(2b1 –a)(b1 – b1) + (u1 –u2)[2(b1 - b1)∂b1/∂u1 – (2b1 – a)∂b1/∂u1]}.   (27) 
 
  The term in brackets in this last expression decreases if we replace ∂b1/∂u1 by 
∂b1/∂u1,  yet the sign turns out  to be positive,  implying that  it  is optimal  to  increase 
 u1     till   the   maximum  limit u.   On   the  other   hand,   (23)   still   implies    that 
 u2D* = p2D*/a = (2b1-a)(u1 – u2)/3. Replacing and solving, we find that: 
 
u1D* - u2D* = 3au/(a + b1), u2D* = u(b1 – 2a)/(b1 + a).      (28) 
 
Replacing into (25) and (26) we observe immediately that ∂b1/∂D > 0. It suffices, 
therefore, to maximize V1D with respect to b1, since sign(∂b1/∂D) = sign(∂b1/∂D). From 
(25) we get: 
 
∂V1D/∂D  ∼ 2[b1 – (b1 + a)/3]/(b1 + a) - (2b1-a) [b1 – (b1 + a)/3]/ (b1 + a)
2 -  (2b1-a)/(3((b1 + a)).    (29) 
 
For D = 0 we have b1 = b and b1 = b, and replacing into (29) we find that ∂V1D / ∂D > 0 
only if b < 2a, which obviously does not hold. Hence the optimal financial structure is 
all-equity in this case, QED.  
 
  The dependence of industry equilibrium on the sequence of decision-making and the 
optimal leverage that it entails appears clearly in a comparison of the results of 
Propositions 9 and 10 for the case where the cost of quality is independent of quality 
level. In such a case u1D* = u1* = u, and Proposition 10 yields a value,                             
u2* = (b – 2a)u/(b + a), 
while under Proposition 9 we have u2D* =  (b1 – 2a)u/(b1 + a) > u2*, and a similar 
relation holds for p2D* and p2*. Aggregate welfare is given by (21) with limit of 
  17 integration (b + a)/3 or (b1 + a)/3 under Propositions 10 and 9 respectively. Replacing 
u1* and u2* for the all-equity Proposition 10 and the levered Proposition 9 cases we 




2] + (b – 2a)/(b + a)[((b+a)/3)
2 – a
2].       ( 3 0 )  
 
The derivative of (30) with respect to b is negative, implying that when b is replaced 
by its larger value b1 as in Proposition 9 aggregate welfare decreases. On the other 
hand, consumer surplus for any firm 2 consumer with taste parameter t is equal to           
(b – 2a)u (t-a)/(b + a), which increases when b is replaced by b1 as in Proposition 9, 
while the surplus for any firm 1 consumer with parameter t isu [t – ((2b-a)/(b + a))], 
which decreases
15 when b is replaced by b1. Hence, the order of decision-making in 
choosing structure or quality first brings important changes to both total and consumer 
surplus.  
 
  Proposition 10 should also be contrasted to Proposition 5 of the previous section, in 
which the order of decision-making is the same but uncertainty exists in the lower, 
rather than in the upper limit of the consumer taste parameter. In the former case 
leverage is profitable and, as Proposition 4 shows, it results in a decrease in 
differentiation and an increase in aggregate welfare. In the latter case leverage is 
unprofitable. The difference stems from the fundamental asymmetry of the strategic 
interactions between the two firms and from the fact that uncertainty affects only one 
of the two firms whenever it exists in only one of the two limits of the consumer taste 
range. In the presence of leverage the strategic interactions with respect to quality 
choice are represented by the signs of the derivatives  ∂[∂RjD/∂uj]/∂ui and ∂[∂Ei/∂ui]/∂uj 
for i = 2 and j = 1 (i = 1 and j = 2) when there is uncertainty in the lower (upper) limit of 
the taste parameter, where RjD and Ei are given by (13) and (14) (by (23) and (24)) 
respectively. The derivations must also take into account the dependence on leverage 
through (17) (through (26). In general the signs of these derivatives are parameter-




VI. Generalizations  and  Extensions: The Role of Free Entry 
 
  Uncertainty and leverage also affect the market equilibrium that emerges when free 
entry of competitors is allowed. In such a case the vulnerable firm is the lower quality 
firm 2, since the natural duopoly assumption guarantees that only the two highest 
qualities can obtain a positive market share. If quality choice is irreversible, and if the 
cost of quality is sunk once quality choice is made, the low quality firm 2 must locate at 
a position that would preclude any subsequent entry of a higher quality firm able to 
realize positive profits. This generally implies that firm 2 must locate sufficiently close 
to firm 1 to reduce its own profits to zero
16. 
 
  We model free entry in this natural duopoly market by assuming that there are a 
large number n of potential entrants producing substitute goods.. These firms play the 
following (n+2)-stage game: in the first n stages each firm, in a predetermined order 
                                                 
15 The consumer surplus also decreases for those consumers who switch from firm 1 to firm 2 
when b1 replaces b in the lower limit of integration of the first integral in (21). 
16 See Hung and Schmitt (1992) and Constantatos and Perrakis (1997, 1999). 
  18 given by its index, makes an irreversible entry decision, which can be either a choice 
of quality or a choice of structure. In the next stage the second irreversible decision 
(structure or quality) is made, and the possibility of non-entry is represented by the 
choice of a quality level u=0 at the stage at which quality is chosen. In the last stage 
those firms with u>0 decide whether to produce or to withdraw their product from the 
market; the withdrawal of those firms whose market share is going to be zero is 
ensured by introducing a “small” marketing cost ε that firms must pay before starting 
production.  
 
  In such an entry game the subgame perfect equilibrium of n quality-price pairs ends 
up with only the two top qualities having positive market shares since the market is a 
natural duopoly by our assumptions about the range of consumer taste parameters. 
Under general conditions about the cost of quality function F(u) the outcome of the 
entry game is quite complicated because of the possibility of “leapfrogging” by an 
entrant who may enter the market with a quality level higher than u1. Firm 1 must, 
therefore, take this into account in its own quality choice, as it must also take into 
account the firm 2 quality choice which wants to avoid being displaced by a higher 
quality entrant
17. Since our purpose is to investigate the effects of financial structure 
on industry equilibrium under free entry, we shall abstract from these complicating 
features of the entry process by assuming that the quality cost F is independent of 
quality level, implying that firm 1 will always locate its quality at the technological 
upper limit u as in Propositions 4 and 10. 
 
  With this assumption free entry only affects the lower quality firm 2, which must now 
locate sufficiently close to u in order to make any further entry unprofitable. Since 
leverage, when it is profitable, affects the value of firm 2, it would also have an impact 
on the firm 2 entry-deterring quality choice. Our main interest in this section is to 
ascertain whether the important results of the previous sections on the impact of 
leverage, increased quality level and reduction of differentiation, are still preserved in 
the presence of free entry.  
 
  The simplest case is when there is uncertainty in the lower limit a of the consumer 
taste parameter range and qualities are chosen before financial structure. In such a 
case Proposition 1 shows that there exists an optimal degree of leverage that 
determines a critical value a1 of the taste parameter, independent of quality levels, 
which determines the value V2D of firm 2 under leverage in (15). Since V2D is a 
monotone decreasing function of the quality level u2, this level must be increased 
sufficiently under free entry so that V2D would become zero. Indeed, suppose that u2 
were chosen at a lower level, at which V2D was positive. Then an entrant firm would be 
able to locate at a marginally higher level of u2, in which by choosing the same optimal 
leverage given by Proposition 1 it would manage to realize a nonnegative market 
value, while the incumbent firm 2 market share would decline to zero.  
 
  Let the superscript e denote the values of the superscripted variables under free 
entry and the ensuing firm 2 entry-deterring policy. In the absence of leverage the 
quality u2
e is chosen by firm 2 by setting the revenue R2
e = (b – 2a)
2(u  - u2
e)/3 – F 
equal to zero. When there is leverage it is the  value                    
V2D
e = (b-2a1)(u1 – u2D
e)[(b + a1)/3 – a]/3 – F that is set equal to zero. In both cases 
entry deterrence increases quality level u2 and decreases both prices p1 and p2 as 
                                                 
17 For a full analysis of the entry process see Constantatos and Perrakis (1999). 
  19 given by (4) with a or a1 replacing a. Of more interest, however, is the comparison 
between the entry-deterring industry equilibrium with and without leverage. From the 
proof of Proposition 1 it is clear that for u2
e = u2D
e we have R2
e < V2D
e, implying that for 
entry deterrence we should have u2D
e > u2
e. On the other hand the comparison 
between the prices p2
e = (b – 2a) (u  - u2
e)/3 and p2D




e; similarly, it can be shown that p1D
e > p2
e as well. Hence, the results of 
Proposition 2 are robust in the presence of entry.  
 
  The same conclusions also hold in the case of free entry when there is uncertainty in 
the lower taste limit a but financial structure is chosen before quality, as in 
Propositions 3-5. Indeed, our analysis of this case in section IV took also place under 
the assumption that the cost of quality is independent of quality level, implying that the 
same entry-deterring levels u2
e and u2D
e as in the previous case are also chosen here, 
even though the optimal financial structure and the value a1 may be different. Last, we 
note that the results of Proposition 7 are also unaffected by the possibility of free 
entry: total surplus obviously increases under leverage; a simple calculation shows 
that consumer surplus increases for every firm 2 consumer under leverage when the 
entry-deterring quality level is used instead of u2* in (21); consumer surplus decreases 
for every firm 1 consumer, given that the optimal quality choice of firm 1 is by 
assumption the same with and without leverage, while the price increases under 
leverage. In other words the threat of entry does not affect the conclusions as to the 
effect of leverage on industry equilibrium when there is uncertainty in the lower taste 
parameter limit.  
 
  By contrast the market equilibrium under leverage and threat of entry has a different 
outcome from the no entry case when there is uncertainty in the upper limit b of the 
taste parameter and qualities are chosen before structure. In this case the quality level 
u2D
e is found by setting R2D* = 0 in (23) for u1 = u, F2 = F and b1 defined as in 
Proposition 8, while for u2
e it is b that must be used instead of b1. Since b1 > b, it is 
immediately obvious that u2D
e must be greater than u2
e in order to set the firm 2 profit 
equal to zero. Here, however, p2D
e = 3F/(b1 – 2a) and p2
e = 3F/(b – 2a), and it is clear 
than p2D
e < p2
e, unlike the case where a was uncertain; a similar calculation also 
shows that p1D
e < p1
e. In this case, therefore, consumer surplus is unequivocally 
higher under leverage for every consumer. Similarly, total surplus can be calculated 
from (21) by setting (b1 + a)/3 as the limit of integration and u2D
e = F/[(b1 - 2a)/3]
2 ; the 
calculation shows that total surplus increases as well when b1 is replaced by b. 
Hence, leverage is unequivocally welfare-enhancing under free entry when there is 







VII.  Conclusions    
 
  We have examined the choice of financial structure in industries in which products 
are differentiated by quality and there is unanimity of consumer preferences when 
prices are set equal to average variable costs. In such industries the fundamental 
asymmetry of the two firms that can survive in equilibrium with positive market shares 
also produces different results depending on whether uncertainty is introduced in the 
  20 lower or the upper limit of the consumer taste distribution.  In both cases, however, 
there are instances where the use of leverage is optimal and has an important impact 
on the industry equilibrium.  
 
  Our main findings are that equilibrium is also crucially dependent on the order of 
decision-making with respect to the quality or the financial structure choice. In all 
cases, however, leverage increases the level of the lower quality, and in most cases it 
also increases the price of the lower quality as well. This has important welfare 
implications, generally raising both total and consumer surplus. These results are 
robust with respect to assumptions about restricted or free entry and the adoption of 
entry deterrence by the lower quality firm. 
 
    In our analysis we have chosen the parameters in order to maintain the natural 
duopoly structure, and we have examined separately uncertainty in the lower or the 
upper limit of the consumer taste distribution. None of the conclusions is expected to 
be affected under restricted entry if the market becomes a monopoly or can 
accommodate a third firm under some values of the random parameters. The market 
would remain a natural duopoly as long as the expected profit of the lower quality firm 
is positive, and provided the expected profit of a third firm is negative. Only the 
functional forms would change for some values of the random parameter, since the 
lower quality firm may have zero sales or leave the market uncovered. Similarly, the 
existence of simultaneous uncertainty in both the upper and the lower limit of 
consumer taste distribution would complicate the analysis but leave the basic insights 
unchanged, since the impact of leverage has similar effects in both cases.  
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